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Goldstein: Goldstine: Contempt of Court

CONTEMPT OF COURT AND THE PRESS
IN MISSOURI*
MILTON
I.

I.

GOLDSTEINt

INTRODUCTION

On several occasions in the history of Missouri, judges have invoked the
contempt power to punish their critics. The state supreme court, acting as
a court of first instance, initiated the practice and made its continuance
possible by holding unconstitutional a statute which stood in the way.' The
act specified types of misconduct punishable by contempt and provided
that in no other cases could this sanction be used. 2 Out-of-court publications
were not on the list. Therefore, when, in 1903, the court cited J. M. Shepherd, publisher of the Warrensburg Standard-Herald, for contempt because
of a berating editorial, a choice had to be made: either the courts could not
deal summarily with a censuring press, or the legislature lacked the power
to limit this jurisdiction. The second alternative was selected; the opinion
stated that a court established by state constitution possessed inherent contempt powers of which it could not be divested by a statute.3
*The writer is indebted to Mr. John R. Green of the Missouri Bar for valuable criticism and many helpful suggestions.
tAttorney, St. Louis. A.B., 1935, A.M., 1936, Washington University; LL.B.,
1939, Harvard University.
1. State ex inf. Crow v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205, 76 S. W. 79 (1903).
2. "Every court of record shall have power to punish as for a criminal contempt, persons guilty of the following acts, and no other: first, disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior, committed during its sitting, in immediate view
and presence, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings, or to impair the
respect due to its authority; second, any breach of the peace, noise or other disturbance, directly tending to interrupt its proceedings; third, willful disobedience
of any process or order, lawfully issued or made by it; fourth, resistance willfully
offered by any person to the lawful order or process of the court; fifth, the contumacious and unlawful refusal of any person to be sworn as a witness, or when
so sworn, the like refusal to answer any legal or proper interrogatory." Mo. REv.
STAT. (1899) §1616. The legislature subsequently removed the words "and no
other" (Mo. LAws 1909, p. 392), leaving the act in other respects as it had been.
Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §2028.
3. 177 Mo. 205, 234-238, 76 S. W. 79 (1903). Enacted in 1835 (Mo. REv.
STAT. (1835) p. 160) and modelled upon the contempt statute of New York
N. Y. REV. STAT. (1829) part iii, c. iii, tit. 2, art. 1, §10), the 'Missouri statute
was one of a series of restrictive acts adopted in the first part of the nineteenth
century following disputed exercises of the contempt power by judges in Pennsylvania (Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319 (Pa. 1788) and Respublica v. Passmore,
3 Yeates 441 (Pa. 1802); Pa. Acts 1808-1809, c. 78, §146), New York (J. V. N.
(229)
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1942
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Judicial blessing was thus conferred upon a procedure which, although
criminal in purpose, differed in several important respects from the conventional mode of prosecution. A judge who is the target of a critical news
story, editorial, or cartoon and is offended thereby may himself set in
motion the criminal process' by issuing a citation ordering the defendant
to show cause why he should not be found guilty of contempt of court or by
suggesting to the prosecuting attorney that the latter prepare an information
containing the charge. 5 In other cases, the accused, by filing an affidavit of
bias and prejudice, can have the matter transferred to another court.' But
here, although the publication has aroused his ire, the judge may hear the

Yates, 4 Johns. 316 (N. Y. 1809), and by a federal judge in Missouri (see STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF, JAMES H. PECK (Act of March 2, 1831), c .98,
4 Stat. 487). Thirty-six states passed laws limiting the scope of the contempt
power. Note (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 58.
Although the early cases, decided when the controversies were still remembered, generally sustained the limitations, the later ones avoided their effect by
either holding the statutes invalid or by construing the enactments as declaratory
rather than restrictive. In only four states-New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Kentucky-have the statutes withstood attack, while ten others have
no reported cases. See Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United
States (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 401, 525.

The federal statute required that the misconduct occur in the presence of the
court "or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice," if it were
to be punishable by contempt. In Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247
U. S. 402 (1918), the Supreme Court held that this referred to-ultimate effect
rather than to physical proximity. The history of the statute made this interpreta-

tion indefensible (see Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure
in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of

Powers (1924) 37 HAauv. L. Rav. 1010, 1027-1038; Holmes dissenting in Toledo
Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S.402, 423), and the original meaning
has recently been restored. Nye v. United States, 313 U. S.33 (1941).
4. A contempt may be regarded as criminal where the purpose of the punishment is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court. In re Clark, 208 Mo.
121, 144-145, 106 S.W. 990 (1907); Carder v. Carder, 61 S.W. (2d) 388 (Mo.
App. 1933); DANGEL, CONTEMPT (1939) 5. "A contempt is considered civil when
the punishment is wholly remedial, serves only the purposes of the complainant
and is not intended as a deterrent to offenses against the public." McCrone v.
United States, 307 U. S.61, 64 (1939); State ex rel. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v.
Bland, 189 Mo. 197, 88 S.W. 28 (1905); Bender v. Young, 252 S.W. 691 (Mo.
1923). Classification is sometimes difficult. See In re Eskay, 122 F. (2d) 819
(1941).
5. The procedure followed in the contempt by publication cases has not
been uniform. In State ex inf. Crow v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205, 209, 76 S.W. 79
(1903), the attorney general filed an information with the court. In Ex parte
Nelson, 251 Mo. 63, 157 S.W. 794 (1913), Judge Guthrie issued a citation without
an intervening information. In State ex rel. Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. Coleman,
152 S.W. (2d) 640 (Mo. 1941), the proceedings originated with an information
filed by the circuit attorney in Judge Rowe's court "at the direction and request
of the Judge of this court."
6. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §§1058-1062, 4037.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss3/2
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case himself.7 Trial by jury does not lie as of right." And there-is said to be
no judicial review by appeal.' Unmitigated by these guarantees. designed
to insure a fair and impartial hearing, the contempt power is an anomaly
in a democratic sytem.
"It is and must be a power arbitrary in its nature and summary
7. Although the statute may provide for change of venue in "criminal" and
"civil" cases, contempt proceedings are held to be sui generis and, therefore, not
included. Dale v. State, 198 Ind. 110, 150 N. E. 781 (1926); State ex rel. Short

v. Owens, 125 Okla. 66, 256 P. 704 (1927); Van Dyke v. Superior Court, 24 Ariz.
508, 211 P. 576 (1922); State ex tel. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Bland, 189
Mo. 197, 207, 88 S. W. 28 (1905); State ex inf. Crow v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205,

238, 76 S. W. 79 (1903). The particular provisions of a few statutes have been

construed as affording trial by a disinterested judge, however. Bridges v. Superior

Court, 14 Cal. (2d) 464, 94 P. (2d) 983 (1939); State ex tel. Simpson v. Armijo,

38 N. M. 280, 31 P. (2d) 703 (1934); Lamonte v. Ward, 36 Wis. 558 (1875);
State ex tel. Cody v. Superior Court, 112 Wash. 571, 192 P. 935 (1920). The
United States Supreme Court has stated that it was better practice for a judge
to disqualify himself (Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 539 (1925); see also
Re Dingley, 182 Mich. 44, 148 N. W. 218 (1914) ), and on rare occasions this has
been done. State v. The American-News Co., 64 S. D. 385, 266 N. W. 827 (1936).
Such a course was termed illegal in the Shepherd case. 177 Mo. 205, 238, 76 S. W.
79 (1903).
8. State ex inf. Crow v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205, 238-243, 76 S. W. 79 (1903);
State ex rel. Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. Coleman, Lx parte Fitzpatrick, and Lx parte
Cogldan, 152 S. W. (2d) 640, 645-646 (Mo. 1941). The constitutional guarantee
of trial by jury is said to be inapplicable because contempt-of-court cases were not
so tried at common law. So far as proceedings to punish constructive contempts
are concerned, modern research establishes the contrary. Fox, CONTEMPT OF COURT
(1927) 49-50; Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal
Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers (1924)
37 HARv. L. REv. 1010, 1046; Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the

United States (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 401; Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S.
42, 66-67 (1924); Maxey, J., concurring in Penn Mining Co. v. Miners of Pa.,
318 Pa. 401, 414-415, 178 At. 291 (1935). See also Woodson and Kennish, JJ.,
concurring in Lx parte Creasy, 243 Mo. 679, 712-713, 148 S. W. 914 (1912).
9. In re Howell & Ewing, 273 Mo. 96, 200 S. W. 65 (1918); Lx parte Clark,
208 Mo. 121, 106 S. W. 990 (1907); State ex tel. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Bland,
189 Mo. 197, 88 S. W. 28 (1905); Carder v. Carder, 61 S. W. (2d) 388 (Mo.
App. 1933); State ex tel. Hawkins v. Utley, 124 S. W. (2d) 684 (Mo. App. 1939).
The point cannot, however, be regarded as settled. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §4130
would seem to permit an appeal in a case of criminal contempt begun by indictment or by information. The Bland case, regarded as the fount of authority, involved a civil contempt where the violation of an injunction was brought to the
attention of the court by the litigant in whose favor it was issued. In In re Ellisbn,
256 Mo. 378, 165 S. W. 987 (1914), the question not being raised, judicial review
was had by appeal. On its facts, the case would not seem to be within the terms
of §3740.

Judicial review can be obtained by means of habeao corpus if a prison sentence is imposed or by certiorariwhere the punishment consists only of a fine. In
State ex tel. Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. Coleman, Lx parte Fitzpatrick, add Lx parte
Coghlan, 152 S. W. (2d) 640, 641 (Mo. 1941), both routes were taken, habeas
corpus by the individual defendants and certiorari by the corporation. The granting of a petition for certiorari is, however, discretionary. See State eo tel. Jacobs
v. Trimble, 310 Mo. 150, 274 S. W. 1075 (1925); State ex tel. St. Louis Union
Trust Co. v. Neaf, 346 Mo: 86, 139 S. W. (2d) 958 (1940); State ex tel. Duraflor
Products Co. v. Pearcy, 325 Mo. 335, 29 S. W. (2d) 83 (1930). "It will be found,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1942
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in its execution. It is perhaps nearest akin to despotic power of
any power existing under our form of government."1 °
The Missouri law reports disclose only three instances wherein the press
has run afoul of the contempt power." Each determination involved the
balancing of important social values momentarily in conflict. On one side
of the scale lay the interest of society in freedom of the press unrestrained by
a censor, albeit a judicial censor, and its abhorrence of all forms of arbitrary
action, including summary procedure; on the other, rested the undisputed
right of a litigant to a trial free from outside influences and to a decision
based on the evidence presented in court. Swift, perhaps even summary,
action might on occasion be required to repel interference with this right.
Injected into the issue also has been the notion that judicial prestige could
and should be maintained by the use of contempt power. That the weights
assigned the aforementioned imponderables have not always been uniform
is evident from the decisions.
A damage suit, a divorce case, and a prosecution for extortion evoked
the critical comment. When a jury brought in a substantial verdict for
Rube Oglesby in his suit against the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company to
recover for personal injuries, the defendant based its appeal on the insufficiencr of the evidence. The supreme court had reversed an earlier
judgment for the plaintiff,12 and it did so a second time. 3 To J. M. Shepherd
the decision indicated that "the corruption of the Supreme Court has been
thorough." Of that body he wrote:
"It has reversed and stultified itself in this case until no sane
man can have any other opinion but that the judges who concurred
in the opinion dismissing the Oglesby case have been bought in the
interest of the railroad ....

The corporations have long owned the

Legislature, now they own the Supreme Court, and the citizen who
applies to either for justice against the corporation gets nothing." 4
also, that where no statutory right of appeal exists or writ of error lies, appellate
courts have been astute and diligent in granting relief by inspecting records under
writs of certiorari or habeas corpus." Lamm, J., in State ex rel. Chicago, B. & Q,
R. R., 189 Mo. 197, 206-207, 88 S. W. 28 (1905).
10. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Circuit Court, 97 Wis. 1, 8, 72 N. W.
193 (1897); see also State ex Tel. Metcalf v. District Court, 52 Mont. 46, 49, 155
P. 278 (1916); Cheadle v. State, 110 Ind. 301, 312-313, 11 N. E. 426 (1887).
11. State ex inf. Crow v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205, 76 S. W. 79 (1903); Ex
parte Nelson, 251 Mo. 63, 157 S. W. 794 (1913); State ex reL. Pulitzer Publishing
Co. v. Coleman, Ex parte Fitzpatrick, and Ex parte Coghlan, 152 S. W. (2d) 640
(Mo. 1941).
12. Oglesby v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 150 Mo. 137, 37 S. W. 829 (1899).
13. Oglesby v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 177 Mo. 272, 76 S. W. 623 (1903).
14. State ex inf. Crow v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205, 210, 76 S. W. 79 (1903).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss3/2
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That judges, like other men, at times resent criticism, particularly when
censure takes the form of vilification, is not surprising. Declaring that "the
character and heinousness of the charges have made it absolutely imperative
upon this court to take cognizance of them,"' 5 the supreme court cited
Shepherd for contempt and found him guilty of the offense. Here, the court
of first instance was at the same time the court of last resort.
Ten years later, Mrs. Clevinger, whose divorce suit was pending in a
Kansas City circuit court, sought to dismiss the proceeding. Simultaneously,
her attorneys filed a petition for an allowance of counsel fees. Judge Joseph
A. Guthrie ruled that the cause would be deemed dismissed on the payment
by the defendant of such fees and court costs. William R. Nelson, publisher
of the Kansas City Star asserted that, as a result of this decision,
"there can be no reconciliations until lawyers have been paid.
It is an important ruling in favor of the divorce lawyers."' 6
As Judge Guthrie read the article, it charged him with being more concerned about the compensation of divorce lawyers than about marital bliss
and with permitting the attorneys whose fees were in question to decide
the issue. The offended jurist, concluding that the criticism was unwarranted and that the publication tended to bring him into disrepute, cited
his critic for contempt and convicted him of the offense. On review, the
decision was reversed. The supreme court agreed with Judge Guthrie that
the contempt power could properly be invoked in such a case.' 7 The manner
in which he sought to exercise it, however, was found defective.""
The latest chapter on the subject was written on June 10th, 1941, when
the same tribunal handed down a decision in State ex Tel. Pulitzer Publishing
Co. v. Coleman, Ex parte Daniel R. Fitzpatrick and Ex parte Ralph Coghlan.' John P. Nick had been prosecuted for extortion before Judge Thomas
J. Rowe, Jr. and acquitted on a directed verdict. When on the trial of the
co-defendant Edward M. Brady, the same judge suggested that the state
dismiss its case unless more evidence would be presented, the circuit attorney accepted the recommendation. To the Pulitzer Publishing Company, its
editorial staff, and cartoonist, the result of the Nick and Brady cases con15. Id. at 218.
16. Ex parte Nelson, 251 Mo. 63, 86-87, 157 S. W..794 (1913).
17. Id. at 96.
18. Id. at 99-106.
19. 152 S. W. (2d) 640 (Mo. 1941). Since the proceeding against the corporation involved the same facts as those against the individual defendants and
since the cases were tried together and decided by a single opinion, this litigation is
hereafter referred to as "The Post-Dispatch Case."
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1942
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stituted a "burlesque on justice." Promptly, Judge Rowe issued a citation
charging that the editorials and cartoon were contemptuous in that (1) the
publications scandalized the court and (2) they referred to, and tended to
influence the decision of, a pending cause. 20 The defendants were found
guilty; 21 but once again the supreme court reversed the judgment of the
trial judge, this time on the merits: the first allegation constituted an insufficient basis for invoking the power;2 2 the second was found unwarranted by
the facts. 28 Regarding the former it should be noted that Judge Rowe had
defined the scope of the sanction in terms of the prior rulings in the Shepherd
and Nelson cases. 24 In the seventeen year period which had elapsed since
the Nelson case, however, the supreme court had changed its mind and
curtailed the jurisdiction.
Because the entire subject has been reexamined in the Post-Dispatch
case, a discussion of the present state of the law appears to be timely. To
analyze this latest adjudication in the light of its antecedents and to interpret its significance as a precedent is the purpose of this article.
II.

ANTECEDENTS OF THE POST-DISPATCH CASE

A.

The Shepherd case

When judges whose conduct has been assailed in the press invoke summary jurisdiction, the power is rested upon one of two props: it is necessary
to protect litigants from trial by newspaper or to maintain judicial prestige.
Upon the rationale advanced may depend the result reached in any given
case. If the former reason is the correct one, then the fact that a judge
has been criticized is relatively unimportant. Interference may come in
countless other ways; and, so long as obstruction resulted, the publication
would be contemptuous. But, once a final decision has been rendered, it is
of no moment to the litigants that future action in another cause may be
affected. They have had their day in court unimpeded. If, however, the
latter reason is adopted, then the pendency vel on of a cause is of no im20. Record in The Post-Dispatch Case, 39-40.
21. Id. at 85-86. Shortly after rendering judgment, Judge Rowe died. The
certiorariproceeding, the only one in which Judge Rowe was a party to the record,
was revived in the name of his successor, Frank B. Coleman, as Judge of Division
No. 12 of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis.
22. State ex rel. Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Coleman, Ex parte Fitzpatrick, and
Bx parte Coghlan, 152 S. W. (2d) 640, 648-649 (Mo. 1941).
23. Id. at 647-648.
24. Cf. 177 Mo. 205, 228-230, 76 S. W. 79 (1903) and 251 Mo. 63, 97, 157
S. W. 794 (1913).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss3/2
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portance. If judges as a group, or as individuals, are sensitive to adverse
comment, they are no less allergic because the reference is to past action.
The test for contempt in the one case is obstruction; in the other, vitupera25
tion.
A publication may vilify a judge without being obstructive. The converse is equally true: there may be interference although the court is ignored.
Mr. Shepherd's article, however, was objectionable on both counts. The
Oglesby suit was still pending on motion for rehearing after the judgment
for plaintiff had been reversed. At this stage of the proceedings, while the
ultimate outcome was still in doubt, the editor of the Standard-Herald
made known his views. The plaintiff "had the best damage suit against a
corporation ever taken to the Supreme Court. ' 2 The appeal of the railroad was misconceived, because "no error was allowed to creep into the
record at the second trial. ' 27 Yet this judgment, too, had been reversed.
Shepherd's explanation was simple: the judges who concurred in finding for
the defendant had "been bought in the interest of the railroad."
"Rube Oglesby and his attorney, Mr. 0. L. Houts, have made
a strong fight for justice. They have not got it. The quivering limb
that Rube left beneath the rotten freight car on Independence hill,
and his blood that stained the right of way of the soulless corporation, have been buried beneath the wise legal verbiage of a venal
court, and the wheels of the Juggernaut will continue to grind out
men's lives, and a crooked court will continue to refuse them and
their relatives damages, until the time comes when Missourians, irrespective of politics, rise up in their might and slay at the ballot
box the corporation-bought law-makers of the State."28
Plainly, these remarks possessed a coercive thrust. Conceivably, the
plaintiff was injured, because after the editorial blast a retreat by the court
from the position previously taken was rendered more difficult. How the
defendant might have been damaged is readily apparent. 29 On the facts
25. Publications "scandalizing the court" are those which charge that the
"administration of justice has been corrupt; that the Court has been prejudiced
or has acted from improper motives or has played politics in its decision." State
v. The American-News Co., 64 S. D. 385, 395-396, 266 N. W. 827 (1936).
26. State ex inf. Crow v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205, 209, 76 S. W. 79 (1903).
27. Id. at 210.
28. Id. at 210-211.
29. In Oglesby v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 177 Mo. 272, 76 S. W. 623 (1903), the
Missouri Supreme Court reversed by a 4-3 vote the judgment for plaintiff in the
trial court. The majority found plaintiff's case built upon conjectures, rather than
proof, of defendant's negligence. Unless one is prepared to take the position that
a motion for rehearing under such circumstances is a formality, the statement that
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1942
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before it, the court could, therefore, have concluded that the pressure
wielded on behalf of a judgment for plaintiff on the motion for rehearing
had injured the party litigants, and jurisdiction to punish by contempt
predicated upon interference with a pending cause. Such a holding would not,
in this instance, have overlooked the scandalizing character of the publication, since it was imputation of improper conduct which created the obstruction. But scurrilous comment in the future might not relate to a pending cause; and, if it did, the tendency to obstruct might not be manifest.
Jurisdiction was upheld on two grounds:
"The contempt in this case ... is criminal, because it scandalizes
the court itself, and, therefore, it is a matter of public concern; and
still pending
it is civil, because it abuses parties to a cause that is,
in this court, and because it seeks30 to prejudice mankind against
parties to such pending litigation.
The fact that, on this occasion, the comment referred to, and tended to
influence the decision of, a pending cause furnished an additional reason for
acting. The court considered the grounds independently sufficient. The
argument that a pending case was a necessary ingredient and the citation of
cases so holding could have been met by the observation that the Oglesby
case was pending. Instead, the court, referring to a classification of types
of contempt by Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, replied:
"It must be obvious to the discriminating mind that such cases
...do not cover the whole field, for there is still the first kind of
contempt, to-wit, scandalizing the court itself, in which the public is
primarily interested, and as to which the injury is just as great
whether it referred to a particular pending case or only to the
court as an instrumentality of government."3"
Although the court found support for its action on both grounds, it is
clear that scandalizing supplied the stimulus. Aside from the isolated statethe case was only "technically" pending when the Shepherd article appeared seems
incorrect (see Nelles & King, Contempt by Publicationin the United States (1928)
28 COL. L. REv. 525, 546) even though the court did not thereafter reverse its

decision.

30. State ex inf. Crow v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205, 232-233, 76 S.W. 79 (1903).
Since the purpose of the proceedings against Shepherd, Nelson, and the Pulitzer
Publishing Company and its employees was punitive rather than remedial, the
contempts involved were all criminal contempts. See note 4, supra. The fact
that the charge is obstruction with a pending cause rather than scandalizing does
not affect the character of the contempt.
31. Id. at 230. Lord Hardwicke's remarks about scandalizing were dicta,
because the publication involved libelled a party to a pending case. See Roach

v. Garvan, 2 Atkyns 469 (1742).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss3/2
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ment that nothing is "of greater consequence, than to keep the streams
of justice clear and pure, that parties may proceed with safety both to
themselves and their characters,132 the opinion contains no detailed analysis
of the obstructive character of the publication, how it interfered with the
hearing on the Oglesby motion, or what degree of interference would justify
a contempt proceeding. "The character and heinousness of the charges"
made it "absolutely imperative" that the court take action.3 3 Without the
power to punish by contempt, "the maintenance of law and order would
be rendered impossible." Courts of justice "would soon lose their hold
upon public respect." " A judge would be "a kicking-post for every madman,
a butt for every idiot or knave, and withal, an object of contempt of all
35
men."
The legislature had stated that in no instance could out-of-court publications be made the basis of contempt proceedings. The court promptly
nullified the restriction. The facts of the Shepherd case required only the
decision (if the exercise of the power was to be validated) that, where a publication refers'to a pending cause and actually obstructs the trial thereof,
summary power exists to punish the offense. Only a limited jurisdiction
would have been thus conferred, however. Instead, the court, in casting aside
the legislative bonds, preferred to stake out a claim to vaster areas of jurisdiction. Publications scandalizing the court as well as articles tending to interfere with the trial of a pending case were punishable by contempt. To be
sure, the Shepherd publication contained direct accusations of serious judical
misconduct; but since the danger which summary procedure was designed
to avert was the loss of public confidence in the judiciary, any remarks
critical of a judge might be, and subsequently were, construed as coming
within the proscribed area.38 Nndefined were the contours of a pending case
and the nature of obstruction therewith which would constitute contempt.
The boundaries of contempt jurisdiction, as here defined, possessed a
vagueness and flexibility which made them all inclusive. They were calculated to induce caution and to deter editorial criticism.
B. The Nelson case
Judge Guthrie read in the article published in the Kansas City Star the
statement that his ruling in Clevinger v. Clevinger evinced an unconcern
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

State ex inf. Crow v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205, 232-233, 76 S.W. 79 (1903).
Id. at 218.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 270.
See note 38, infra.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1942
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for marital bliss. He noted, too, the suggestion that he had been guilty
of delegating his judicial function by permitting the lawyers concerned to
decide the questions. He resented both charges, and, in a citation issued to
William R. Nelson, publisher of the newspaper, stated that the article:
"did defame and insult the Circuit Court of Jackson County,
Missouri, and did charge its Presiding Judge with subserviency, and
that said action in publishing said article tends to bring this court,
and the judge thereof, into disrepute, and contempt." . . . 7
The defendant was found guilty of scandalizing the court. 3 Omitted from
the judgment, as from the citation, was a finding or charge of obstruction.
On habeas corpus, Nelson was discharged, the result being grounded
upon events transpiring at the trial. When the alleged contemner offered
to prove that the facts stated in the article were true and did not scandalize the court, objection to the introduction of such evidence was sustained. 3' Judge Guthrie at once proceeded to read an opinion, prepared the
night before, finding the defendant guilty40 Even though he was prepared
to alter this conclusion if anything new should develop, the procedural requirements of the due process clause had not been met. A criminal defendant
4
must be presumed innocent until guilt is established. '

37. 251 Mo. 63, 73, 157 S. W. 794 (1913).
38. The all inclusive nature of the definition of scandalizing formulated in
the Shepherd case is illustrated by the article of William R. Nelson (pp. 86-87).
Unlike the publication of J. M. Shepherd, it contains no express charges of corruption, prejudice, or political bias. See note 25, supra. The commissioner, appointed by the supreme court to take evidence, found that the article was substantially true and was not contemptuous in character. Patently, Judge Guthrie's
ruling did favor divorce lawyers. Although there is a headline stating "The Lawyer
Decided," the body of the publication indicates -that what is meant was that
the decision was made pursuant to a request and argument by plaintiff's attorney.
39. Id. at p. 101.
40. The opinion began as follows:
"It was perfectly clear to me, when I knew this matter was coming on for
trial today, although the truth of the matter charged against this court was directly
pleaded in the return of this respondent, that no testimony could be offered in
the remotest way tending to prove the truth of the article in the respect wherein
it is alleged in the complaint that it constituted a contempt of court" (p. 101).
41. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S. 42 (1924); Gompers v. Bucks
Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911). Where the contempt is direct (misconduct occurring in the presence of the court), punishment may follow immediately, without notice or a heating. See In re Clark, 208 Mo. 121, 106 S. W. 990
(1907); Bender v. Young, 252 S. W. 691 (Mo. 1923). But where the contempt is
indirect or constructive (misconduct outside the presence of the court), the defendant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to defend. Cooke v. United States,
267 U. S. 517 (1925); In re Clark, 208 Mo. 121, 106 S. W. 990 (1907); EX parte
Nelson, 251 Mo. 63, 157 S. W. 794 (1913). Courts have occasionally referred to
offending newspaper articles as direct contempts. See Myers v. State, 46 Ohio
473, 22 N. E. 43 (1889); People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195, 211 (1872); Dale v. State,
198 Ind. 110, 150 N. E. 781 (1926).
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The statement that Nelson had not been given a fair trial would have
disposed of the case. But the opinion proceeded to deal with other questions. The voluminous discussion in the Sheplerd opinion had been expressly
justified on the ground that the public should have notice of the law, so that
well meaning persons might not innocently offend 42 No reason is assigned
for the dictum in Ex parte Nelson. Apparently it was intended to demonstrate that the defeat was personal to Judge Guthrie. He had lost a legal
battle, but the power of the courts to punish summarily an offending press
had not been abandoned. Thus, the scandalizing dogma was reasserted:
"the punishment to be imposed is upon the guilty party for the
purpose of punishing him for the crime committed and to deter him
and all others from traducing and scandalizing the courts of the
country and the judges thereof, which if tolerated, would bring
them in disrepute and cause the citizens of the State to lose confidence in and respect therefor, as well as for the majesty of the law
43
itself, all of which would inevitably lead to chaos and anarchy."
The defendant had argued that, to constitute contempt, a publication
must refer to a pending cause. Ten years earlier, this contention had been
made in the Steplierd case and rejected as erroneous: scandalizing the
44
court was in itself a sufficient basis for the exercise of summary jurisdiction.
In the Nelson case, the same answer could have been made. But, instead of
asserting that the pendency of a case was immaterial where the charge was
scandalizing, the court took issue on the facts:
"That is a clear misapprehension of the order. While it is true
the motion for the allowance of attorney fees had been.sustained and
the allowance made, yet the order dismissing the case was made
upon condition of the payment of the fees so allowed.
Clearly that was not a final disposition of the case. ...
The allowance in that case not having been paid, it was, according to the authorities cited, still pending and undisposed of at
the time the article in question was published." 4' 5
This line of argument sought to prove that the Clevinger case was
still pending. But suppose that it was: Where was the interference? Obstruction had been neither alleged nor proved. If the court meant that,
given a pending case and an article referring thereto, interference was conclusively presumed, obstruction was a mere fiction. The Shkepherd case
42.
43.
44.
45.

177 Mo. 205, 215, 76 S. W. 79 (1903).
Ex parte Nelson, 251 Mo. 63, 97, 157 S. W. 794 (1913).
See note 31, supra.
Ex parte Nelson, 251 Mo. 63, 98, 157 S.W. 794 (1913).
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furnished no authority for such a conclusion. From the citation, it is clear
that Nelson was being punished for scandalizing the court; and, if that is
true, of what importance was it that the article referred to a pending case?
If the court meant that the offense of scandalizing required a publication directed at a pending case, even though there was no interference
theriwith, then a new ingredient was being added to the crime.
In rejecting the cases cited by the defendant to show that scandalizing
was not a sufficient basis for invoking contempt jurisdiction, the court in the
Shepherd case had commented on "the error they have fallen into of
saying that the contempt must relate to a cause that is still pending." There,
the simple answer to the argument was the fact that the contemner's article
did refer to a pending case. The court preferred instead to assert a broader
power based solely upon the character of the publication. However, in Ex
parte Nelson, the procedure was reversed. This time the simple answer consisted of the citation of the Shepherd case to support the proposition that
scandalizing was an independent ground of jurisdiction. Intervening decisions had, however, weakened the authority of the Shepherd case,40 and
46. In the Shepherd case, the court had declared: "The law is well settled,
both in England and America, that the Legislature has no power to take away,
abridge, impair, limit, or regulate the power of courts of record to punish for
contempts." 177 Mo. 205, 235, 76 S. W. 79 (1903).
In 1905, Judge Lamm, who had not been a member of the court two years
earlier, commenced his efforts to limit the Shepherd case. In State ex rel. Chicago,
B. & a R. R. v. Bland, 189 Mo. 197, 88 S.W. 28 (1905), he spoke for the
court in upholding a statute permitting appeals in cases of civil contempt, although
this procedure did not exist at common law. Again, in In re Clark, 208 Mo. 121,
106 $.W. 990 (1907), in a majority opinion he expressly defined the holding of
the Shepherd case which alone, as contrasted with the dicta, was binding precedent.
In a ringing dissent, in which two others concurred, Judge Lamm contended that,
as a matter of comity, the court should recognize legislative limitations on the
punishment which might be imposed. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Gildersleeve, 219
Mo. 170, 190, 118 S.W. 86 (1909). "I do not hesitate to say that the unregulated,
arbitrary, whimsical power to fine or imprison for contempt, a power that will not
brook a mere temperate and reasonable control, is contrary to the genius of our
institutions and the policy of our Constitution and statutes" (p. 197). The minority
opinion in the Gildersleeve case later became the law. Ex parte Creasy, 243 Mo.
679, 148 S.W. 914 (1912). Said the court: "I am aware that this section has been
declared unconstitutional in the case of State ex inf. Crow v. Shepherd, 177 Mo.
205, and Railroad v. Gildersleeve, 219 Mo. 170, but I think those cases are wrong
and ought to be overruled.... To my mind the sooner some of the broad doctrine
of both the Shepherd and Gildersleeve cases is overruled, the better it will be
for the jurisprudence of thePState." (p. 708).
It was not long after Ex parte Nelson was decided that the court asserted that
the legislation regulating contempt jurisdiction had come as a result of "excessive
abuse of authority" by judges. "The extreme power claimed by the courts, as
announced in the case of State ex inf., v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205, shows the wisdom of those enactments." In re Ellison, 256 Mo. 378, 382-383, 165 S.W. 987
(1914).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss3/2
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the court was beginning to wonder whether its claims to power had not
been extravagant. It was thought desirable, therefore, despite the effort
required, 46a to breathe life into Mrs. Clevinger's dormant suit so that the
contempt defendant might be confronted with both a pending case and with
the scandalizing doctrine.
The opinion in Ex parte Nelson exposed the Shepherd decision to attack
on still another score. The Shepherd case had held that judges accused of
corruption could personally try their accuser.4 7 A single qualification was
now imposed: the court must not be biased. The court might state that "the
character and heinousness of the charges" made action imperative. It might
issue a citation charging that the publication brought the judges into disrepute and public ridicule; but the defendant must not be found guilty until
after trial. It is asking too much of human nature to expect a judge to keep
an open mind regarding the validity of charges which he, as prosecutor, has
formulated. 48 The very construction placed upon the publications by
judges in issuing citations, like those to Shepherd and Nelson, renders it
impossible for them to try such cases with objective impartiality.

46a. See pp. 254-255, infra.
47. "The judges of this court would have gladly sent this matter to some
other court for trial, and by a jury, too, if such a course had any precedent or
justification in law. But as such a course would have been illegal and a shirking
of their imperative obligations under the law, they had no option but to deny
the request, and to execute the law" (p. 238). But see notes 7 and 8, supra.
48. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 539 (1925) and Craig v.
Hecht, 263 U. S. 255 (1923), where Chief Justice Taft stated: "The delicacy there
is in a judge's deciding whether an attack upon his own judicial action is mere
criticism or real obstruction, and the possibility that impulse may incline his view
to personal vindication, are manifest" (p. 279). To the same effect, see Chicago,
B. & Q R. R. v. Gildersleeve, 219 Mo. 170, 200-201, 118 S. W. 86 (1909), and
Ex parte Creasy, 243 Mo. 679, 689, 148 S. W. 914 (1912).
It is because of the recognition of this fact that, although in other cases the
findings made in the judgment are immune from collateral attack, in contempt
cases no presuiption will be indulged in favor of the findings. In re Howell &
Ewing, 273 Mo. 96, 200 S. W. 65 (1918); Ex parte Creasy, 243 Mo. 679, 148 S. W.
914 (1912); Ex parte Shull, 221 Mo. 623, 121 S. W. 10 (1909). The pleadings are
scanned with extreme seventy, ii favor of the accused. Sands v. Richardson, 252
S. W. 990 (Mo. App. 1923); Ex parte Stone, 183 S. W. 1058 (Mo. 1916); In re
Shull, 221 Mo. 623, 121 S. W. 10 (1909) Ex parte Creasy, 243 Mo. 679, 148 S. W.
914 (1912). The character of the trial afforded has been found ground for reversal. Ex parte Nelson, 251 Mo. 63, 157 S. W. 794 (1913); In re Clark, 208 Mo.
121, 106 S. W. 990 (1907). Misconduct labelled contempt has been found to be
punishable in other proceedings but not by contempt process. State ex rel. Madden
v. Padberg, 340 Mo. 667, 101 S. W. (2d) 1003 (1937); In re Ellison, 256 Mo. 378,
165 S. W. 987 (1914). Of some forty-one contempt cases (many of them for direct
contempts) which have come before the appellate courts of Missouri since the
Shepherd case, slightly more than seventy-five per cent have resulted in the discharge of the convicted contemner.
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Before the hearing, Judge Guthrie prepared an opinion finding Nelson
guilty. At the trial, offers of proof by the defendant were rejected, and the
decision read. But the conclusion of the supreme court that the publisher
of the Kansas City Star had been prejudged does not depend upon any of
these facts, either singly or in juxtaposition. They might all be altered
without necessarily affecting the outcome. If, for example, Judge Guthrie
had permitied the defendant to offer proof, the result would have been
the same. If the court had adjourned after the hearing and reconvened
a month later for the reading of the opinion, the due process clause would
still have been violated. Indeed, had the opinion been reduced to writing
a week, a month, or a year after the hearing, it would have made no difference provided the judge had arrived at his decision before. The facts of the
Nelson case merely furnished evidence of a state of mind. Judge Guthrie's
error was subjective.
Until science has devised a barometer which will accurately gauge
human emotions, conjectures of prejudice can seldom be replaced by more
certain knowledge. Rarely can evidence be adduced to show that the trial
was a mere formality. 49 To argue, however, that proof of bias would in
49. In the Post-Dispatch case, it was argued that Judge Rowe had prejudged

the case (Brief for Relator, pp. 90-110). The contention was based upon the
wording of the citation, which contained findings of fact in addition to those presented in the verified information of the circuit attorney and expressed an opinion
of guilt, in terms leaving open only the question of the punishment to be assessed;
and in the reiteration of the above findings in the judgment, although they were
denied in the answer, shown by the publications to be false, and although no
evidence was taken.
The supreme court admitted that some of the language used in the citation
was "unfortunate"; but found the record "wholly dissimilar to that in the Nelson
case." The opinion points out that the defendants were given an opportunity
(1) to file a return and (2) to present evidence; (3) the court took the case under
advisement for several days before rendering an opinion, and (4) exonerated one
of the defendants. 152 S. W. (2d) 640, 645 (Mo. 1941). On the first point, it may
be suggested that that was true in Ex parte Nelson as well; on the second, that the
case was decided on the state's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Until it was
denied, the evidence stage of the proceedings had not been reached. The third
reason lacks probative value. No doubt the fourth reason is the most persuasive.
Benjamin H. Reese, one of the original defendants, disclaimed responsibility for
the publications and was discharged. This fact is not, however, inconsistent with
the hypothesis that the trial judge reserved the right, as in the Nelson case, to
change his mind from a predetermination of guilt If knowledge or responsibility
for the publication is admitted, a conviction would not necessarily follow. Open
mindedness on this issue alone would not, therefore, be sufficient.
The court's conclusion may be supported on the ground that, as a matter of
policy, the burden of proof on the issue of prejudgment should be a heavy one and
that in this case it was not met. To argue, however, that in the Nelson case, the
record was "wholly dissimilar" is to distend minor differences in degree into differences in kind.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss3/2
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any event be wanting is to contend that in the Nelson case alone was there
prejudgment; but that in the others, including the Shepherd case, the
defendant was presumed to be innocent. A reading of the cases in Missouri
and in other jurisdictions casts doubt upon the validity of such a conclusion.50
On the surface, the court in Ex parte Nelson gave a vote of confidence to
the most offensive portions of the Shepherd decision. Their eventual repudiation was rendered more certain by the conclusions reached, however. The
addition of the pending case ingredient made scandalizing a meaningless hybrid. By enforcing the requirements of procedural due process, the court
unwittingly applied the reductio ad absurdum technique to the Shepherd
opinion.
C. The scandalizing doctrine
The judges of the Missouri Supreme Court stated in the Shepherd case
that the offense of scandalizing the court (as distinguished from interference
with a pending case) could be punished summarily. They reasoned that the
publisher of such an article should be punished; that judicial prestige would
be impaired if judges lacked the power to protect themselves from hostile
comment; and that authority could be found to support the jurisdiction.
That this conclusion was unsound, however, is not fairly arguable. To justify
the exercise of contempt power on the basis of the first reason is to be guilty
of a non sequitur. History and logic negate the second. Finally, what precedent exists, is inapposite.
A citation for contempt was not the only method of proceeding against
Shepherd. One who has been libelled can bring a civil suit against his
defamer. A criminal prosecution may lie, in addition.-' If the person injured
is a judge, he is endowed with the same remedies. His position neither aggravates nor lessens the character of the offense any more than if he were a
member of the legislative or executive branch of the government.5 2 If such
50. See, for example, United States v. Craig, 279 Fed. 900 (5. D. N. Y. 1921);
Craig v. Hecht, 263 U. S. 255 (1923); and In re Fite, 11 Ga. App. 665, 76 S. E.
397 (1912); where the judge stated that "in defending the honor of the judge,
so inexcusably and unjustly assailed, he could not at all times fully restrain the
indignation of the man" (p. 695). See also Nelles & King Contempt by Publication
in the United States (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 525, 545. The same objection might
perhaps be made to this article. The writer was of counsel in the Post-Dispatch
case.

51. See Mo.

REv. STAT.

(1939) §§4758-4761.

52. Legislative bodies have power by contempt to compel witnesses to appear
before committees and answer questions pertinent to the legislative inquiry. AnPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1942
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publications injure judges, they are no less harmful to legislators or administrators. Yet, no one seriously contends that the President or Congress,
a governor or state legislature is or should be empowered to fend off criticism
by contempt process.
Discussion of the conduct of officials is the essence of democratic government. 53 Criticism, as well as praise, aids the electorate in selecting able
men for public office.54 The necessity of removing incompetent or corrupt
men may be indicated in this way.-5 Discussion may reveal flaws in judicial
doctrine and indicate the need for improvement through corrective legislation. If the comment is just, it is not only the publisher's right, but his duty,
to make it. If, on the other hand, the criticism lacks foundation and injury
results, the abuses may be penalized; but it does not follow that the contempt process is the weapon to be employed. Where a charge of misconduct
has been made against a public officer, truth should be a complete defense."0
Even if it were an answer to a citation for contempt, few would have the
hardihood to attempt to prove to the judge accused that he was venal or
corrupt. He is not the proper person to pass upon such an issue. This is a

derson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204 (U. S. 1821); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S.
135 (1927); Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U. S. 125, 150 (1935). But the power
is confined to questions having a valid connection with contemplated legislation
(Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1880) ) and does not extend to slanderous
attacks. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521 (1917).
53. "The newspapers, magazines and other journals of the country, it is safe
to say, have shed and continue to shed more light on the public and business
affairs of the nation than any other instrumentality of publicity; and since informed
public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgment of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded
otherwise than with grave concern. . . . A free press stands as one of the great
interpreters between the government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is
to fetter ourselves." Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U. S. 233, 250 (1936).
54. State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Circuit Court, 97 Wis. 1, 8-10, 72
N. W. 193 (1897); Storey v. People, 79 Ill. 45, 51-52 (1 875); Nixon v. State, 207
Ind. 426, 440, 193 N. E. 591 (1935); State v. American-News Co., 64 S. D. 385,
394, 266 N. W. 827 (1936).
55. The newspaper articles which first charged judge Manton with bribery
and corruption unquestionably scandalized him. See United States v. Manton,
107 F. (2d) 834 (1938); In re Levy, 30 F. Supp. 317 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
56. Truth is said to be no defense to a citation for contempt Patterson v.
Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 462 (1907); JOHN L. THOMAS, LAW OF CONSTRUcrIVE CONTEMPr (1904) 86; DANGEL, CoNTrrM
(1939) 175. In Missouri, the rule seems
otherwise. State ex inf. Crow v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205, 268, 76 S. W. 79 (1903).
What happens when the alleged contemner attempts to defend on this ground is
illustrated in Bx party Nelson. See note 40, supra. Truth would, of course, be
immaterial where the charge is interference with a pending cause. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 188 Mass. 449, 74 N. E. 682 (1905); Dale v. State,
198 Ind. 110, 150 N. E. 781 (1926).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss3/2
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situation in which the remedy by libel-where trial is by a jury and a disinterested judge-is -better adapted to promote justice.57
Most specious of the arguments advanced is that scandalizing publications-induce disrespect for the courts and thus impair their usefulness in the
trial of future causes. The contempt sanction must therefore be employed
to insure the due administration of justice. This contention, if carried to its
logical conclusion, would welcome comment as long as it was favorable;
summary punishment would be visited upon those who censured. The courts
have properly been quick to repudiate any desire for immunity from
criticism.58 "No court can, or should, hope that its opinions and actions
can escape discussion and criticism."' 59 The experience of the United States
Supreme Court, which though frequently scandalized has never made use
of the contempt power, and of the several state tribunals, divested by statute

of summary power to punish out-of-court publications, 60 has indicated no loss
of respect for these courts; nor has it demonstrated any necessity for the
power. Instead, it is the attempt to arbitrarily silence criticism that results
6
in a loss of public respect. '
Authority to support summary jurisdiction over scandalizing publications has been derived from certain early English cases. This practice, originally founded upon a misconception, 62 has now become obsolete in Great Bri-

57. The Clayton Act and certain state statutes provide for a jury trial in
cases where violation of the court's injunction is charged. Michaelson v. United
States, 266 U. S. 42 (1924); Penn Mining Co. v. Miners of Pa., 318 Pa. 401, 178
Ad. 291 (1935); see also CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE U. S. (1941) 549.
58. See cases cited in note 54, supra, and In re Pryor, 18 Kan. 72 (1877);
State ex rel. Metcalf v. District Court, 52 Mont. 46, 155 P. 278 (1916); Craig
v. Hecht, 263 U. S. 255 (1923).
59. Dunham v. State, 6 Iowa 245, 254 (1858).
60. See Ex parte Steinman, 95 Pa. 220 (1880); Rutherford v. Holmes, 66
N. Y. 368 (1876); Adams v. Gardner, 176 Ky. 252, 195 S. W. 412 (1917).
61. '"What respect is the public likely to have for a penalty imposed by, a
judge on a verdict of guilty rendered by himself as a sole juror? In such a case,
the people instead of upholding the judge sympathize with the man sentenced.
It is a deep-seated human instinct to rebel against arbitrary power." Penn Mining
Co. v. Miners of Pa., 318 Pa. 401, 422-423, 178 At. 291 (1935). But cf. State v.
Frew, 24 W. Va., 416, 456 (1884).
In finding Shepherd guilty, the Missouri Supreme Court said: "Let the honest
and fair-minded patriotic people of this State say whether or not it was the duty
of the court to punish him" (p. 269). The response was immediate. Shepherd's
fine was paid by public subscription. At the next election, he was chosen Railroad
Commissioner of the State of Missouri. A former judge of the supreme court
wrote a book attacking the decision. JOHN L. THOMAS, LAw OF CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEMPT (1904).

62. See note 8, supra.
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tain.63 It was the spiritual offshoot of a theory of government requiring
royalty to be invested with an imaginary perfection. This sanctity devolved
upon judges who sat "in his seat concerning his justice and it was meet to
keep a 'blaze of glory around them'."64 But it was not all of the common law
which crossed the ocean. Those portions which were inconsistent with American institutions were expressly rejected by statute. "" Of this nature was
the offense of scandalizing the court. "It no more follows that . . . courts

possess the power of certain British courts of the eighteenth century to
punish summarily for constructive contempts than it follows that the chief
executive .. . possesses all the 'inherent powers' of the British eighteenth
68

century chief executive.1
Less than a handful of Arierican courts accepted the proposition that
scandalizing the court afforded a proper basis for invoking contempt jurisdiction.6 1 At the time when Judge Rowe issued his citation to the Pulitzer
Publishing Company and to its staff members, however, Missouri was probably one of them.
III.

THE

POST-DISPATCH

A.

CASE

The facts

The Post-Dispatch contempt case had its background in litigation involving the misconduct of John P. Nick and Edward M. Brady, who had
been indicted for extorting ten thousand dollars from motion picture exhibitors in 1936. On payment of this sum of money, it was charged,
demands for wage increases for the members of the union they represented
were withdrawn.68 After severance, the former was acquitted on a directed
verdict; 69 the latter was discharged when the circuit attorney entered a
63.
1EMPTS

See McLeod v. St. Aubyn (1889) App. Cas. 549,561;
BY PUBLICATION (1940)

SULLIVAN,

CON-

139.

64. Nelles &.King, Contempt by Publicationin the U. S. (1928) 28 COL. L.
REV. 401, 408.

65. See cases cited in notes 54 and 58, supra; Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) §645.
66. Maxey, J., concurring in *Penn Mining Co. v. Miners of Pa., 318 Pa.
401, at p. 146, 178 At. 291 (1935). The United States Supreme Court has held
that Congress does-not derive its contempt power from the House of Commons.
Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S.521, 537 (1917).
67. 'Burdett v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 838, 48 S. E. 878 (1904); In re
Chadwick, 109 Mich. 588, 67 N. W. 1071 (1896); State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384
(1855); Comment (1905) 18 HARv. L. REV. 392; Note (1923) 36 HARV. L. REv. 93.

68. For a detailed account, see Robinson v. Nick, 136 S.W. (2d) 374 (Mo.

App. 1940).

69. The case first went to trial before Judge Robert L. Aronson, then sitting
in Division No. 12. On October 18, 1939, the jury was discharged because of a
conversation held between a juror and a witness. On November 6, 1939, a mis-
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1

nolle prosequi. Editorially and by cartoon,7 the Post-Dispatch criticized
the course and disposition of the Nick and Brady cases, particularly the
action of Judge Rowe in suggesting abandonment of the proceeding unless
more evidence was forthcoming,72 the ineffective conduct of the prosecution
by the circuit attorney, and the patent defects in Missouri criminal procedure. As a literary device designed to infuse vigor and color into the
comment, the legal proceedings were discussed in terms of a theatrical pro7
duction. "
The decree in an equity suit brought by the union against Nick and
others provided the occasion for further comment. The court found that
the defendants had received from the exhibitors ten thousand dollars (the
money Nick and Brady had been charged with extorting) which belonged
to the union treasury and ordered them to deposit it there. A second
editorial appeared, contrasting the divergent results in the civil and criminal
cases and indicating a preference for the former. 74 Awaiting trial on the
docket of Judge Rowe at the time was a prosecution against Nick and one
Clyde A. Weston, who were charged with extorting sixty-five hundred dollars from motion picture exhibitors in 1937. Judge Rowe directed a citation to the publisher, the editor of the editorial page, and the cartoonist,
alleging that the publications charged the court with corruption and partiality
in the discharge of its duties and tended to interfere with and obstruct the

trial was declared when it was discovered that one of the jurors had failed to
reveal his acquaintanceship with some of the members of Nick's family. On
December 11, 1939, Judge Aronson discharged the jurors a third time when one of
them reported to the court that he had been offered a bribe to hold out for an
acquittal.
70. Record in the certiorariproceeding (against the corporation) pp. 16-18.
71. Id. at p. 22.
72. Since in the Nick trial Judge Rowe had stated that his decision to take
the case from the jury was a close one and since the circuit attorney indicated
that some evidence would be presented, the editorial asserted that Judge Rowe
should have permitted the case to go to trial.
73. The editorial was entitled "A Burlesque on Justice. THE AMAZING CASE
OF PuTrY NOSE, a legal skit in one very short act, presented under the auspices of
the State of Missouri, in association with the people of St. Louis, in Circuit Court,
Criminal Division, with the following cast. . . ." (Record, p. 16). The cartoon,
captioned "Burlesque House in Rat Alley," depicted a theater whose current
production was stated to be "10 Grand Gone With The Wind" (Record, p. 22).
74. Brady was discharged on March 4, 1940. The first editorial (note 73,
supra) appeared on March 5th. Judge Ernest F. Oakley decided the equity suit
the same day. On March 6th appeared the second editorial and the cartoon.
75. Ben H. Reese, Managing Editor of the Post-Dispatch, also cited for contempt, disclaimed knowledge and responsibility therefor (Record, pp. 48-49, 67)
and was discharged. Id. at p. 86.
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trial of the Nick and Weston case."' In due course, the defendants were found
guilty. 8

B. The decision
1. The Scandalizing Doctrine
The scandalizing charge made by Judge Rowe against the Pulitzer
Publishing Company and its employees was weaker than that presented in
the Slepherd case. For forthright expression and literary invective, the
article of J. M. Shepherd has no rivals in this state and few serious contenders
elsewhere. It was argued by the defendants in the Post-Dispatchcase that,
although their publications criticized Judge Rowe's decision in the Nick
and Brady trials as unfortunate and unsound, the charge of corruption or
venality was missing -from the articles. Whether or not the difference in
the character of the publications in the two cases would have made a difference in the result had the decision on the law been otherwise is not clear.
In this instance, the court assumed that the nature of the Post-Dispatch
77
editorials and cartoon would not alone have barred a prosecution.
But there was a more formidable obstacle to be hurdled. The period
after 1903 (when the Shepherd case was decided) had witnessed a broadening of the scope of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Freedom of speech was now protected from impairment by state action
where it had not been when Shepherd was on trial.78 No federal decision,
it is true, had as yet applied the constitutional guarantee to contempt proceedings; but two cases involving the question were then before the United

76. The defendants' answer denied that the publications scandalized the
court or referred to or interfered with the Nick and Weston case, set up the public
interest in the matter discussed and the publisher's purpose-to improve the administration of justice, and- invoked the constitutional guarantees of due process
and freedom of speech (Record, pp. 44-63). The case was disposed of on a motion
for judgment on the pleadings; the Pulitzer Publishing Company was fined $2000,
execution to issue in default of payment (Record, p. 87), defendant Coghlan was
fined $200 and sentenced to twenty days' imprisonment (ibid.), and defendant
Fitzpatrick was fined $100 and ten days' imprisonment (Id. at p. 88). The cases
of the individual defendants went up on habeas corpus, that of the corporation by
certiorari (Record, p. 89). The three cases were consolidated above.
77. It may be that the concurring opinion did not make this assumption.
See note 88, infra.
78. It was not until 1925 that the United States Supreme Court held that
freedom of speech was protected from impairment by state action by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652
(1925); see dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J., in Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S.
325, 343 (1920), and of Harlan, J., in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. b. 454, 465

(1907).
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States Supreme Court.79 In both, the state court had sustained the exercise
of summary power on the ground that the publications interfered with the
trial of a pending case. The jurisdiction was challenged as an abridgment
of freedom of speech and of the press. Until the Supreme Court spoke, the
nature of the interference required under the Constitution to validate the
restriction was in doubt. The temper of the present court, however, gave
warning that summary jurisdiction based on scandalizing would not satisfy
the minimum requirements.8 0 The Missouri Supreme Court avoided the
necessity of handling the constitutional problem by repudiating the scandalizing doctrine. Said the court:
"The elaborate argument in the Shepherd case to prove that
a publication scandalizing the court was punishable as contempt was
based upon a misunderstanding of legal history. ' ,If the cause to which the article referred was concluded, however objectionable the publication might be, it was not punishable as a contempt.8 2
That this jurisdiction was founded in error would not alone condemn it.
The doctrine was held to be theoretically unsound, as well-the reasons
justifying summary procedure did not apply when the case had been closed.
"The reason why a direct interference with a pending case is
punishable is obvious. The trial cannot be stopped while another
jury is impaneled ;nd the interferers prosecuted criminally or sued
civilly. The court must have the power to quickly and in a summary
fashion enforce its orders and prevent acts which would hinder and
delay the proceedings before it. But in the case of a publication
having reference to a closed case, these reasons do not exist. ' s 3
There being no need for haste, the matter can await a trial by jury.
The Missouri law had been aligned with that of other jurisdictions. 4
79. Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. (2d) 464, 94 P. (2d) 983 (1939), cert.

granted, 309 U. S. 649 (1940); Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. (2d)
99, 98 P. (2d) 1029 (1940), cert. granted, 310 U. S. 623 (1940). Both cases were
decided by a single opinion on December 8, 1941. See note 91, infra. The last
previous contempt judgment of a state court to be reviewed was Patterson v.
Colorado, 205 U. S. 454 (1907), 18 years before the decision in the Gitlow case.
80. This would probably be true under either the clear and present danger rule
(Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940) ) or the dangerous tendency test
(Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925)). Although the Supreme Court
divided 5 to 4 in the Bridges and Times-Mirror cases, there was no disagreement
on this point. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the minority, said: "Such
foolishness has long since been disavowed in England and has never found lodgment here."
81. See note 22, supra at 647.

82. Id. at p. 648.

83. Id. at p. 647.
84. See notes 54 and 58, supra.
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Formulated in the Shepherd case, where a conviction could have been, and
subsequently was, rested upon another ground, the scandalizing doctrine
was reaffirmed in the Nelson case, where it did no harm, and repudiated
in the Post-Dispatch case, the first time a conviction depended upon its
validity.
2. Interference with a Pending Cause
In casting aside a portion of its summary jurisdiction, the court did
not reinstate the original legislative restrictions and divest itself of all contempt power with respect to out-of-court publications. The question of interference with a pending cause was raised by the citation and by the judgment
of Judge Rowe. However, the finding by the supreme court that the publications did not refer to the Nick and Weston prosecutiono made further comment unnecessary. Approval or disapproval of this independent ground of
contempt jurisdiction could, therefore, have been withheld for another day.
Had this course been followed, though, little would have been left standing
in the midst of wreckage: the bulk of the Shepherd opinion had been swept
away; the dictum in the Nelson case was but a confused restatement of the
same material. Yet it was the excursion in dicta which now made it necessary that the Shepherd case be overruled in part. Nevertheless, the court
preferred to indicate that something remained.
"But it is also contended by the relator and petitioners that
even though a publication relate to a case still pending in court and
constitutes a direct personal and vindictive criticism of the conduct
of the court in such case, it cannot constitute contempt. With this
we do not agree." 0
The decision in the Shepherd case had been salvaged, the holding approved on the ground of interference with a pending cause.
It is disturbing to find in this opinion the same association of obstruction
with criticism of the court before which a case is pending that was present
in the Shepherd and Nelson opinions. The gist of the matter is not criticism
but interference. Comment upon the evidence or violent denunciation of
a party litigant may produce considerable obstructionA.1 On the other hand,
unreasoned criticism of a judge may result in no direct interference at all.
In each of the three Missouri contempt cases in which the press has figured,
the offense charged was criticism. What had caused trouble was the at85. See note 22, supra at 649.
86. rd. at p. 648.
87. See SULLIVAN, CONmMPrS

BY PUBLICATION
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tempt to convert the offended judge into the aggrieved party when it was
the litigants, whose case was the subject of comment, who had been injured.
A continuance of this judicial preoccupation could mean that, although the
scandalizing doctrine of the Shepherd case had been discarded, that of the
Nelson case was retained.88
The atmosphere of the Post-Dispatch opinion, however, differs markedly
from its predecessors. For the first time the importance of freedom of the
press is accorded recognition. In the Shepherd case, the argument had been
brushed aside with the observation that only abuse was being punished."9
Such cavalier treatment ignored the deterrent effect of summary jurisdiction
and also the truth that a proceeding in which the aggrieved party sits as trier
of fact is not calculated to properly decide the issue of use or abuse.
Implicit in the Post-Dispatchopinion is a realization of the vital considerations involved.
* "The interest of society in the spread of truth is made possible
by untrammeled discussion, and this is most important. But there
are other social interests such as the preservation of order and the
right of litigants to a fair trial and a decision based solely on the
88. See pp. 9-10, supra. Judges Douglas and Ellison concurred in a separate
opinion which read: "Douglas, Justice concurs, but is of the opinion that 'scandalizing the court itself,' as an idstitution, is contempt against which a court has the
power to protect itself in the interest of the public, a principle heretofore approved
by this court in State ex inf. v. Shepherd; and for such reason disagrees with so
much of the majority opinion which may be construed to deny this power or to
overrule State ex inf. v. Shepherd as to this principle." 152 S.W. (2d) 640, 649
(Mo. 1941).
The point at which the concurring opinion departs from the majority opinion
is not clear. The latter assumed that the Post-Dispatch publications scandalized
the court. If Judges Douglas and Ellison also indulged this assumption and yet
believed scandalizing a proper basis for contempt jurisdiction, a dissenting, rather
than a concurring, opinion would have been proper unless, by the phrase "as an
institution," a distinction is drawn between scandalizing the judge and scandalizing
the court. The argument may be that in certain instances a libel suit would not
lie because the offending publication did not single out a judge or group of judges
as objects of the attack. A conviction on this ground would violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Bridges v. California, Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 86
L. Ed. 149 (decided Dec. 8, 1941).
89. "It is the liberty of the press that is guaranteed-not the licentiousness. It
is the right to speak the truth-not the right to bear false witness against your
neighbor." 177 Mo. 205, 257 (1903). That this is not a sound interpretation of
the constitutional guarantee,

see CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES

(1941)

14: "To argue that the federal constitution does not prevent punishment for criminal utterances begs the whole question, for utterances within its protection are not
crimes.... Clearly, we must look further and find a rational test of what is use
and what is abuse. Saying that the line lies between them gets us nowhere. And
"license" is too often "liberty" to the speaker, and what happens to be anathema
to the judge."
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law and the evidence, which are equally important; and a balance
between these interests in case of conflict must be struck." 0
An unfettered press free to comment upon the acts of public officials was
a potent guaraitee that able men would be elected to office and incompetent and corrupt men removed. "Therefore, the judge cannot be immune
from criticism. The people who must pass upon his continuance in office have
a right to be informed of his weakness, venality, or inefficiency."o °a But it
was just as important that trial by newspaper should not supplant trial by a
°
court and jury. b
These are the only issues properly involved. Yet, in the earlier Missouri
cases, freedom of the press had been ignored and the integrity of judicial
proceedings considered solely as a makeweight. The Post-Dispatch, opinion
promoted them in the scale of values. Formerly, vindication of judicial
prestige was the dominant consideration. Although this mistaken notion
was not completely discarded, there was at least a shift in emphasis from
the person of the judge to the cause he was engaged in trying. Since the
weights of the factors now regarded as controlling were exerted on opposite
sides, the necessity of a compromise was apparent. A basis for reconciliation
is suggested:
"such information can clearly be given... through comment on
his actions in closed cases without attempt, through criticism of his
conduct in pending cases, to intimidate or interfere with his un" °
biased decisions. 0

If the right to comment on litigation is to be embraced within the
definition of freedom of the press, the license to comment upon a closed
90. 152 S. W. (2d) 640, 648 (Mo. 1941).
90a. Ibid.
90b. "The freedom of speech provisions of the constitution, for example, do
not grant immunity to one who speaks slanderous words of his neighbor, nor prevent the punishment of one who solicits another to commit a crime. In the same
way they do not give any privilege to utter or publish words which directly
interfere with the orderly processes of a court in administering justice in a pending case. Publication of personal and unreasoned criticism of a court before which
a case is pending often tends to substitute trial by newspaper for trial by court and
jury, and -would tend to bring about a decision based upon the momentary whim
of a publisher or the desires of a mob rather than one based upon the law and the
evidence." Ibid.
But it is equally true that contempt proceedings tend to substitute trial by
the person most concerned for trial by jury and by a disinterested judge. See
notes 48 and 57, supra. The argument is not that offenses should not be punished,
but that they should be punished in the usual manner. The examples given in
the portion of the opinion just quoted are cases in which the conventional criminal processes were employed.
90c. Ibid.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss3/2
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case is a minimum recognition. A greater immunity may, however, be afforded. The court does not state that any reference to a pending case will
be punishable as a contempt; nor indeed does it attempt to indicate the
nature of the obstruction required to invoke the contempt power. The facts
of the Post-Dispatck case did not require such a pronouncement. Moreover,
the project was fraught with danger since the United States Supreme Court,
would shortly define the limitations imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment.01 The court was willing to wager, however, that the Constitution did
not abolish summary jurisdiction with respect to out-of-court publications.
92
Its prediction was soon confirmed.
By its opinion in the Post-Dispatch case, the Missouri Supreme Court
left for the future the demarcation of the outer limits of its contempt power.
The holding of the Shepherd case was approved, and a veiled warning emitted that criticism of the conduct of judges in pending cases would be viewed
with disfavor. But "criticism" is a weasel word, comprehending at one and
the same time the intimidating utterance of J. M. Shepherd and the mild
expression of disapproval of William R. Nelson. If the court meant to restrict
the term to publications of the former type, then freedom of the press
will enjoy a sympathetic common law protection in this state. If it did not,
the opinion in the Post-Dispatchk case can be cited to support a future
holding narrowly restricting comment to matters which have been finally
concluded. Pending clarification, the scope of summary jurisdiction in Missouri is elastic. It can be expanded or contracted at will, subject only to
the right of review.

91. The Supreme Court ruled 5 to 4 that freedom of speech and of the
press could be abridged by the contempt power only if there existed a clear and
present danger of interference with the trial of a pending case. Bridges v. California, Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 86 L. Ed. 149 (Dec. 8, 1941). Both
the majority and the minority opinians apply such a test (pp. 153, 174), although
the formee indicates that the result would have been the same on the reasonable
tendency rule and the latter opines that the difference between the two tests "is
not of constitutional dimensions" (p. 170). The majority found the possible influence of the publications in question on the course of justice to be "negligible"
(p. 161); to the dissenters, the publications created "an atmospheric pressure
incompatible with rational, impartial adjudication" (p. 168).
92. Although Justice Frankfurter expressed fear that the majority opinion
deprived the states of power by contempt to prevent interference with the administration of justice (86 L. Ed. 161-162), the majority did- not go that far (see p.
161). The analysis in the opinion by Justice Black of the publications involved
to appraise their coercive character would not have been necessary if summary
jurisdiction were lacking in any event.
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3. The Historical Fallacy
The assumption that at common law constructive contempts were dealt
with summarily has been disproved by the recent studies of Sir John Charles
Fox.93 The truth is that, outside of Star Chamber, they were punished

only by the usual criminal procedure, including trial by jury. How the
error had its inception and gained currency is "one of the strangest stories
in the history of the law.' 3a The discovery by scholars of the mistake has
not had immediate judicial repercussions. In the Post-Dispatch case, perhaps for the first time, 9 b a court in this country, after reviewing the findings, based a holding thereon: "The elaborate argument in the Shepherd
case to prove that a publication scandalizing the court was punishable as
contempt is based upon a misunderstanding of legal history."
The achievement was a hollow one, however, for the significance of the
discovery was not fully appreciated. Elsewhere in the opinion the court
discusses the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury and holds it inapplicable to contempt proceedings; elsewhere, too, the court states that
judges may invoke summary jurisdiction to prevent interference with the
trial of a pending cause. Only in the treatment of the scandalizing doctrine
is the historical argument mentioned. But constructive contempts based
upon scandalizing publications were not the only constructive contempts
which at common law could not be prosecuted summarily. Contempts based
upon obstruction had the same erroneous foundation. And the identical
"elaborate argument" was employed in the Shepherd case to prove them
punishable by contempt. If historical fallacy condemns the former, it
condemns the latter with equal force. Reasons may, of course, exist for the
discarding of the one and the retention of the other. The vice inherent in
the opinion in the Post-Dispatch case is that in one instance the court
accepts this body of information wholeheartedly and in another ignores it
completely.
The issue of trial by jury was raised by the defendants in the Post-Dispatch case, reliance being placed upon a territorial statute whose requirements, it was argued, were carried over by the guarantee in the state con93. See note 8, supra.
93a. Fox, CONTEMvr OF COURT (1927) 227.

93b. But cf. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S. 42, 66-67 (1929). See
also Pennsylvania Mining Co. v. Miners of Pa., 318 Pa. 401, 414-415, 178 At. 291
(1935); Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. (2d) 464, 94 P. (2d) 983 (1939);

Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. (2d) 99, 98 P. (2d) 1029 (1940).
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stitution. As construed by the court, however, this act did not extend trial
by jury to contempt proceedings; hence, the constitutional provision could
not be invoked."4 But, as already noted, Sir John Charles Fox found that
constructive contempts were tried by a jury at common law, and the Missouri Supreme Court endorsed his conclusions. The constitutional guarantee
would thus apply irrespective of the territorial statute. Moreover, it .would
follow that, since at common law constructive contempts were not tried
summarily, the legislative restrictions-invalidated in the Shepherd casedefined contempt jurisdiction as it existed at common law."' The inherent
contempt powers possessed by courts were not, therefore, limited in any
way, and the statute could not have been unconstitutional. Although it is
true that the contempt statute was amended to remove the bar against the
exercise of summary power in instances not specified in the act, the result
would be the same. The restriction of this jurisdiction to the enumerated
instances would stem from the common law.
The historical argument was probably merely one of several considerations impelling the repudiation of the scandalizing doctrine. A rule of law,
though born in error, may be presently useful. Subsequent discovery of its
origin would not justify its extirpation. Piece-meal acceptance of the material of Sir John Charles Fox might be a valid conclusion. But if this were
intended, the court should have so stated. Judicial silence will be construed
as evidence that the matter was not considered and that the question
remains unsettled. At some future date when contempt power is invoked
to punish for interference with a pending case, the jurisdiction will be
attacked upon historical grounds. And the issue of trial by jury will again
be raised and supported by quotations from the opinion in the Post-Dispatch
case.
4. The Pending Case Concept
a. When is a case concluded?
Once the court decided that judicial prestige was not the interest protected by summary jurisdiction, an objective appraisal of the considerations
94. 152 S. W. (2d) 640, 645-646 (Mo. 1941).
95. Fox, CONTEMPT oF COURT (1927) 226: "The result may be that where,
in the United States, there is a conflict between the Judiciary and the Legislature,
the Legislature and not the Judiciary has correctly interpreted the law, and the
decisions asserting the power of the Court to punish certain classes of contempt
by summary procedure will need reconsideration. The Courts will have discarded
the statutes and founded themselves on English decisions, whereas the law turns
out to be, not what the the decisions indicate, but what the American statutes have
declared it to be."
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involved became possible. So far as the public is concerned, the proceedings
of courts are ephemeral, of interest only in the present. If press comment is
to be effective, therefore, it must follow closely upon the act appraised.
Newspapers deal in news, not history. A rule of law deferring comment
impairs the value of the publication by affecting its timeliness. As the
period of enforced delay is increased, the restriction grows more burden95
some. a
How long is a case to be regarded as pending? Until judgment is rendered? Until the case is removed from the docket? What test can be applied?
A decision rendered by the court in an earlier case made this question
acute. In State v. Lonon,90 it was held that a judge could, at any time during
the term, set aside a nolle prosequi and reinstate the cause upon the docket.
Since the extortion proceedings against Edward M. Brady had been nolle
prossed and the term had not yet expired, Judge Rowe might have reconsidered the matter. Therefore, it was argued, the Brady case was pending during the entire term; hence the Post-Dispatch publications referred to a pend"ing cause.
In Ex parte Nelson the situation was somewhat similar. The Clevinger
divorce suit had been dismissed subject to the payment of attorneys fees
and court costs. Judge Guthrie had not been asked to review his ruling, the
subject of Mr. Nelson's criticism. All that remained was a mechanical act
on the part of the defendant, in no way related to the merits of the case.
Yet the supreme court stated that it was a mistake to suppose that the

95a. Justice Black makes this argument very effectively in the majority opinion in the Bridges and Times-Mirror Co. cases. 86 L. Ed. 149, 156: "It must
be recognized that public interest is much more likely to be kindled by a controversial event of the day than by a generalization, however penetrating, of the
historian or scientist. Since they punish utterances made during the pendency of
a case, the judgments below therefore produce their restrictive results at the precise
time when public interest in the matters discussed would naturally be at its
height.
"Yet, it would follow as a practical result of the decisions below that anyone
who might wish to give public expression to his views on a pending case involving
no matter what problem of public interest, just at the time his audience would
be most receptive, would be as effectively discouraged as if a deliberate statutory
scheme of censorship had been adopted.
"This unfocused threat is, to be sure, limited in time, terminating as it does
upon final disposition of the case. But this does not change its censorial quality.
An endless series of moritoria on public discussion, even if each were very short,
could hardly be dismissed as an insignificant abridgment of freedom of expression.
And to assume that each would be short is to overlook the fact that the 'pendency'
of a case is frequently a matter of months or even years rather than days or weeks."
96. 331 ,Mo. 591, 56 S. W. (2d) 378 (1932).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss3/2
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97
The
divorce suit was not pending at the time the article was written.
final
after
even
pending
a
case
make
to
be
effect of this dictum would
judgment had been rendered. In the Post-Dispatchcase, however, the court
refused to follow through. Of State v. Lonon the court said:

"But this holding does not necessarily mean that after a case
has been dismissed it is still to be considered pending during the
entire term at which the order of dismissal was made within the
meaning of the contempt rule above set out. There are intimations
to that effect in Ex parte Nelson, 251, Mo. 63, 157 S.W. 794, but we
are convinced that that is not the law. [citing cases] To rule otherwise would be to narrow the limits of permissible criticism so greatly
'' 8
that the right to criticize would cease to have practical value."
Whether, by the statement that the "intimations" in Ex parte Nelson
were not the law, the court intended to repudiate the dictum or merely to
reject the implications therein contained as they applied to the facts of the
Post-Dispatch. case is not clear. The facts of the Nelson case can be distinguished from those of State v. Brady. In the latter, the cause had been
concluded, although by appropriate action it might be reinstated. In the
former, the cause remained on the docket of the court despite the fact
that it lay in the power of the defendant to remove it. -But, as a practical
matter, there is no difference. The rulings in both instances had been made
before the publications appeared. Nothing awaited decision at the time. The
restraint upon the press was as great in the one case as in the other. If
the doctrine of State v. Lonon were incorporated into the definition of a
pending case, newspaper comment would be delayed one term; application
of the dictum in Ex parte Nelson could cause a greater delay. Disavowal
of the dictum in the Nelson case would seem, therefore, to be implicit in the
rejection of State v. Lonon.
The problem of how long a case is pending can be presented in a great
many factual combinations. Only a few of these situations have, as yet, been
ruled upon in Missouri. Few will deny that a cause is pending when argued
on a motion for rehearing, as in the Shepherd case. Where the prosecution
has been dropped, as in the State v. Brady case, it seems reasonable to hold
that the stage of finality has been reached. These are not mechanical questions
to be judged by the technical criterion of whether the case still possesses

97. See p. 239, supra.
98. See note 22, supra at 649.
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life or could conceivably be revived. 9 If comment is to be restrained because of interference, the curb should apply only where a real danger of
obstruction with a matter then awaiting determination exists. The ruling in
the Post-Dispatc. case gives promise that this problem will be handled in
a realistic manner.
b.

Wtick case must be pending?

Judge Rowe charged in the citation and found in judgment that the
editorials and cartoon in the Post-Dispatch tended to interfere with the
trial of the case of State v. Nick and Weston. At the time of the Brady discharge and the Post-Dispatch comment, this cause was on Judge Rowe's
docket awaiting trial.
The supreme court found that the publications referred to the Nick and
Brady trials and not to the Nick and Weston case. 00 Weston's name was
mentioned once in an editorial; but that was in connection with the equity
suitiooa Even so, there was a great deal of similarity between the two
cases. True, the Nick and Weston case involved an independent transaction
which took place in 1937 instead of 1936; one of the defendants was new as
were certain of the exhibitors. Yet, the points of likeness are more impressive: both had their setting in the dealings of the same union and the same
exhibitors. Why then should interference with the Nick and Weston case
not be regarded as a proper basis for contempt? The Missouri Supreme
Court gave this answer:
"True, Nick was a party to both criminal cases and the issues
involved were similar. But, if right to criticize a closed case is to be
denied simply because a case involving a similar issue is still pending, it would be so greatly curtailed as to be valueless. Nor can the
simple fact that the same party appears in both cases be determinative. Sometimes a large number of cases are filed against one defendant. Could it be contended that a writer must wait until the
last of these cases was decided before uttering any criticism of the
decision of the first? A careful reading of the editorials and a careful consideration of the cartoon leads us to the view that they did
not interfere with or influence the case of State v. Nick and
Weston, but were leveled exclusively at the concluded Nick-Brady

99. See dissenting opinion of Holmes, J., in Craig v. Hecht, 263 U. S. 255, 281
(1923); Comment (1941) 26 WASH. U. L. Q. 564.
100. See note 22, supra at 648-649.
100a. See p. 247, supra.
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cases and not at the pending criminal charges against Nick and
Weston."101
Two reasons are assigned: First, publication of the Post-Dispatch editorials
and cartoon did not influence the Nick and Weston case; second, to hold
otherwise would impose too great a restraint.
If the court meant that the outcome of the Nick and Weston case was
not affected by the publications, the conclusion might be a reasonable one,
although it would occasion dissent. If, on the other hand, the court intended
to assert that comment on closed cases may not influence other pending
actions, the conclusion is patently incorrect. Forthright comment, even
after the final adjudication of a case, may influence judges in deciding
future similar cases. Editorials denouncing the granting of excessive allowances in receiverships or the issuance of injunctions in support of "yellow
dog" contracts played an important role in curing the abuses against which
they inveighed. "If a decision of a judge is bitterly criticized after he has
rendered it, it is hardly to be expected that he can entirely erase that fact
from his mind when a few months later he comes to try a very similar
case."' 0 2 This is as true of praise as of criticism.
The court did not err in result; but the reason for denying contempt
jurisdiction rests solely on considerations of policy. It is another instance
in which "a balance between these interests in case of conflict must be
struck." If similarity in parties-plaintiff or defendant-made it necessary
that comment be postponed, the delay would be indefinite. The single-term
postponement entailed by the application of State v. Lonon, would be slight
by comparison.. If similarity of issues necessitated restraint, comment might
be forever delayed.
Such a rule would have the added vice of impeding discussion in cases
where comment would be proper. An examination of -all the court files in
the jurisdiction would be necessary to discover other litigation involving
similar parties or issues. For a publication with nation-wide coverage, the
search required would needs be even more extensive. Then too, a party
03
might be involved in a suit, although his name did not appear of record.1
101. Ibid. A federal prosecution against Nick and Weston, which included
among the charges the extortion of the sixty-five hundred dollars from exhibitors
in 1937, resulted in the conviction of the defendants. See Nick v. United States,
122 F. (2d) 660 (1941), cert. denied, (1941) 10 U. S. L. WEEK 3176.
102. State v. American-News Co., 64 S.D. 385, 397, 266 N. W. 827 (1936).
103. Since the case against Nick and Weston was on Judge Rowe's docket, an
extensive search would not have been required to discover it. Yet, the principle
discussed is applicable since litigation involving Nick and Weston in federal and
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Broadly speaking, all experience tends to bolster or weaken given conclusions. To avert outside influence which might affect future judgments would
require an order freezing the mental processes of judges as of a given date
or isolating them from contact with their fellows.
In the Post-Dispatch case, the court adopted a happy compromise.
The danger of interference should be minimized. Therefore, publications
must be explicit in referring to a concluded case; the identity of the parties
involved and the action taken must be distinctly set forth. These precautions taken, the publisher's immunity is complete.10 4
IV.

CONCLUSION

With the opinion in the Post-Dispatclk case an era of contempt law in
Missouri came to a close. It was a period characterized by widely fluctuating
doctrine. For three quarters of a century out-of-court publications were by
statute removed from the orbit of summary jurisdiction. 10° In 1903, as a
result of the unfortunate opinion in the Shepherd case, the pendulum
swung to the other extreme: the restrictions were invalidated and power
asserted to deal not only with publications interfering with the trial of a
pending case but also over those which scandalized the court. The view
that the contempt sanction was a device to ensure judicial prestige was unsound in principle; it was unwise as a matter of policy. Removed from
the emotional strain of the Shephierd case, the court began to doubt the
wisdom of its extravagant claims to power. In Ex parte Nelson, the court
tried to hedge, imply that scandalizing publications could be punished summarily only when they referred to a pending case. The way was paved for
the general retreat of the Post-Dispatchcase, where the court, abandoning
scandalizing as an independent basis for summary power, sought a middle
course.

Briefly stated, the Missouri Supreme Court held in judgment that
comment, however critical, was not punishable by contempt if it referred
state courts growing out of the same activities had not been concluded at the
time this article was being written, long after the lessons learned in State v. Nick

and Brady had grown stale.

104. "The danger that the administration of justice in future cases will be

embarrassed or impeded by criticism of past decisions (even if violent, vituperative,
or undeserved) is relatively remote and we think it better, as a matter of social
policy that such risk should be taken rather than that the process of contempt

should be used in such cases." State v. American-News Co., 64 S. D. 385, 397, 266
N. W. 827 (1936).
105. See note 3, supra.
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to litigation already concluded. The finality of the determination was neither
affected by the fact that, until the term of court expired, the cause might
be reinstated on the docket nor by the circumstance that another cause,
involving similar issues and parties, was then awaiting trial. Dictum being
a conventional ingredient of a contempt opinion, the court warned that
publications interfering with the trial of a pending case could still be
punished summarily.
The opinion in the Post-Dispatck case is important primarily for the
work of destruction accomplished. The scandalizing doctrine was eradicated
from the law and a closed case so defined as to provide freer rein to press
comment. To say that the court took a step in the right direction should
not, however, obscure the fact that much still remains to be said. Several
major problems, such as trial by jury and the scope of summary jurisdiction,
cannot be regarded as settled because of the court's failure to consider the
effect of the Fox historical data. Although the opinion declared that publications interfering with the trial of a pending case were punishable summarily, the nature of the obstruction required was left for future determination. The danger that temperate comment may be converted into fancied
obstruction because of a judicial preoccupation with criticism has not been
removed by the Post-Dispatck case. 00 By its opinion in the Bridges and
Times-Mirror Co. cases, the United States Supreme Court has indicated
that it will be on the alert to prevent abuse of the contempt power by state
courts. Abridgment of the guarantee of freedom of speech was found where
publications, stronger than the editorials and cartoon of the Post-Dispatch
and referring' to a pending case, were made the basis for summary punishment. Within the framework of the opinion in the Post-Dispa-tck case, the
Missouri Supreme Court may extend equivalent common law protection to
the press.

106. The judges referred to by the publications in the Bridges and TimesMirror cases did not themselves try the contempt charges against these defendants.
86 L. Ed. 149, 175. See note 7, supra.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1942

33

